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Notes
STRICKLER v. GREENE: PREVENTING INJUSTICE BY
PRESERVING THE COHERENT "REASONABLE PROBABILITY"
STANDARD TO RESOLVE ISSUES OF PREJUDICE IN BRADY
VIOLATION CASES
In Strickler v. Greene,1 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the Commonwealth of Virginia violated Brady v. Mary-
land' and its progeny when the prosecution maintained an open file
policy but failed to disclose exculpatory documents to the defendant's
counsel.3 The Court held that although the undisclosed documents
containing impeaching eyewitness testimony were favorable to the de-
fendant for the purposes of a Brady analysis, the defendant failed to
establish the prejudice necessary to meet the materiality require-
ment.4 The majority justified this decision by identifying the three
fundamental components of a true Brady violation 5 and by determin-
ing that the third component-that the defendant can satisfy the ma-
teriality inquiry-was not established because the defendant did not
convince the Court that there was a reasonable probability that the result
of the trial would have been different had the suppressed documents
been disclosed to the defense.6 In using the "reasonable probability"
standard to determine whether a verdict is worthy of confidence,7 the
1. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
2. 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also infra note 47 and accompanying text (stating the facts
and holding of the Brady decision).
3. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 265-66 (identifying the issue before the Court); id. at 273-75
(describing the documents that provided the basis for the defendant's Brady claim).
4. Id. at 296.
5. Id. at 281-82 ("There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence
at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inad-
vertently; and prejudice must have ensued."). The Court determined that the first two
components were "unquestionably established by the record." Id. at 282. As for the first
component, the State's key witness, Anne Stoltzfus, changed her testimony at trial from
what she had initially related to the police-that the incident was merely a "trivial episode
of college kids carrying on." Id. The contrast between her testimony and the documents
containing her initial statements to the police "sufficiently established" the impeaching
character of the documents. Id. The second component was also established because
there was no dispute that the Commonwealth knew that the documents existed but did not
disclose them to defendant's counsel. Id.
6. Id. at 296.
7. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (noting that "[o]ne does not show a
Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should have been
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Court prudently chose not to adopt the capricious "significant possi-
bility" standard' and preserved a comprehensible evaluative form em-
bedded in case history. The reasonable probability standard provides
a clear and consistent measure by which judges can accurately gauge
the effect of Brady violations. Furthermore, by virtue of its reliability
and endurance, the standard safeguards procedural due process
rights afforded to every individual under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment9 and prevents occurrences of injustice by providing certainty to
judges, lawyers, and defendants alike.
I. THE CASE
On January 5, 1990, Thomas David Strickler and Ronald Hender-
son abducted, robbed, and violently murdered Leanne Whitlock, a
James Madison University student."° Strickler was convicted of capital
murder and sentenced to death for all three offenses in the Circuit
Court of Augusta County.11 In a separate trial, Henderson was con-
victed of first-degree murder, a noncapital offense. 2 At Strickler's
trial, Anne Stoltzfus, the prosecution's key witness, provided vivid testi-
mony concerning Whitlock's abduction.13 Before and during the
excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the
whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict"); see also
infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing what Strickler needed to show in or-
der to undermine confidence in the jury's verdict).
8. In his partial dissent, Justice Souter argued that the standard for measuring
prejudice in Brady violation cases should be phrased as "significant possibility" instead of
"reasonable probability," the phrasing the Court has repeatedly embraced. ld. at 298-301
(SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The two standards will be discussed
at great length throughout this Note.
9. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part: "No State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 266. Whitlock died as a result of multiple blunt force injuries
to the head inflicted by a sixty-nine-pound rock. Id. at 269.
11. Id. at 276-77. In Strickler v. Virginia, 404 S.E.2d 227 (Va.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944
(1991), the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Strickler's conviction.
12. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 266.
13. Id. At trial, Stoltzfus stated that she was at a local shopping mall on the day that
Whitlock was abducted. Id. at 270. Stoltzfus testified that she had witnessed Strickler,
whom she described as "Mountain Man," and Henderson, whom she called "Shy Guy,"
walking around at the mall. Id. at 270-71 (quoting App. 36-37). She further testified that
Strickler was "revved up" and that she followed them because she was concerned about
Strickler's behavior. Id. at 271 (quoting App. 36-37). Stoltzfus testified that after leaving
the mall she had witnessed "Mountain Man" approach Whitlock's car, pound on the door,
force himself into the vehicle, and motion for Henderson and an unidentified woman to
also get into the car. Id. Stoltzfus then pulled her car parallel to Whitlock's car and saw
Strickler hit Whitlock. Id. at 271-72. Stoltzfus stated that after she had driven away she
realized that Whitlock had mouthed the word "Help." Id. (quoting App. 47). When asked
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trial, the prosecutor maintained an open file policy, which theoreti-
cally gave Strickler's counsel access to all of the evidence in the Au-
gusta County prosecutor's files, including notes from police interviews
with Stoltzfus. 4 Because of this open file policy, Strickler's counsel
did not file a pre-trial motion for discovery of possible exculpatory
evidence.1 5 In closing argument, he conceded that the evidence at
trial was sufficient to support the robbery and abduction charges as
well as the first-degree murder charge, but argued that the evidence
was insufficient to prove that the defendant was guilty of capital mur-
der.'6 The judge instructed the jury that Strickler could be found
guilty of the capital offense if the evidence established, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that Strickler had "'jointly participated in the fatal
beating' "17 and had been "'an active and immediate participant in the
act or acts that caused the victim's death.'"" The jury found Strickler
guilty of abduction, robbery, and capital murder.' 9
Strickler filed a federal habeas corpus petition, alleging that his
trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance due, in part, to his
failure to file a motion under Brady v. Maryland.2 ° The circuit court
dismissed his petition, and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.21
Strickler then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.22 The district
court entered a sealed ex parte order granting Strickler's counsel the
right to examine and copy all of the police and prosecutorial files in
the case.2 3 That order led to Strickler's counsel's first examination of
the Stoltzfus documents, which included materials prepared by Stoltz-
if pretrial publicity about the murder had influenced her identification, Stoltzfus replied,
"'Absolutely not.'" Id. at 272-73 (quoting App. 58). She explained, "'I have an exception-
ally good memory.... I have absolutely no doubt of my identification.'" Id.
14. Id. at 276.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting App. 160-61). Because of the size of the rock that inflicted the inju-
res, it was likely impossible that a single person had lifted it and dropped it while simulta-
neously holding the victim down. Id. at 269.
18. Id.. at 276 (quoting App. 160-61).
19. Id. at 277. The jury recommended death after finding the predicates of "future
dangerousness" and "vileness." Id.
20. Id. at 277-78; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "sup-
pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
21. Strickler v. Murray, 452 S.E.2d 648, 653 (Va.), cert. denied sub nom. Strickler v.
Angelone, 516 U.S. 850 (1995).
22. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 278.
23. Id.
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fus and notes taken by a police detective who had interviewed Stoltz-
fus.24 These documents impeached significant portions of her trial
testimony.25 Based on the discovery of these documents, Strickler
raised a direct claim that his conviction was invalid because the prose-
cution had failed to comply with the Brady rule and, therefore, that
Strickler had been denied due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment.26
The district court granted Strickler's application for a writ of
habeas corpus and vacated his capital murder conviction and death
sentence because the Commonwealth had failed to disclose exculpa-
tory evidence that was "sufficiently prejudicial to undermine confi-
dence in the jury's verdict."2 7 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit vacated in part the district court's decision and re-
manded the case with instructions to dismiss the petition because
Strickler had not raised his constitutional claim at his trial or in the
state collateral proceeding; thus the court could not address the Brady
claim unless Strickler could demonstrate cause and actual prejudice.28
The Fourth Circuit also concluded that even if Strickler's claim could
overcome the procedural default, the Brady claim would fail on the
merits because the "'Stoltzfus materials would have provided little or
no help ... in either the guilt or sentencing phase of the trial,' ,,29 and
thus Strickler could not establish prejudice.3"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the
Commonwealth had violated the Brady rule, whether the procedural
default was excused by an adequate showing of cause, and, if so,
24. Id. at 273.
25. Id. The "Stoltzfus Documents" were the materials that provided the basis of the
defendant's Brady claim. Id. These materials included a handwritten note prepared by
Detective Daniel Claytor after his first interview with Stoltzfus two weeks after the crime.
Id. The note indicated that she could not identify the victim. Id. Furthermore, defendant
proceeded to trial without having seen a summary of the abduction. Id. at 274. Also in-
cluded in the Stoltzfus documents was a note that contained her impressions of Whitlock's
car. Id. The note did not mention the license plate number, which she "vividly recalled at
the trial." Id. One other exhibit to which the defendant was not privy was a brief note
from Stoltzfus to Detective Claytor, which stated that after spending time with Whitlock's
boyfriend looking at photos, she was able to identify Whitlock. Id.
26. Id. at 278.
27. Id. at 265, 279.
28. Strickler v. Pruett, 149 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir. 1998), affd, Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263 (1999).
29. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280 (quoting App. 425 and noting that the defendant would
still be guilty of a first-degree murder charge and that, in terms of sentencing, Stoltzfus's
testimony was not the only evidence used in the jury's findings of future dangerousness
and vileness).
30. Id. at 279-80.
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whether Strickler had established the prejudice necessary to under-
mine confidence in the jury's verdict.3
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The term "Brady violation" generally refers to any breach of the
prosecution's broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence.32 In
determining how to articulate the Brady standard, the Court has rec-
ognized that the rule must be consistent with case law and must safe-
guard the accused's due process rights in order to prevent
occurrences of injustice.33 Even before the Brady concept's actual in-
ception in 1963, the Court had already noted that the State must pro-
vide a corrective judicial process when a defendant has been denied
the due process of law.3 4 These judgments prior to Brady laid the ini-
tial groundwork for later decisions that would produce a standard to
measure prejudice to the accused while protecting his or her due pro-
cess rights. From 1935, when the Supreme Court decided Mooney v.
Holohan,35 to its monumental Brady decision in 1963, to its 1995 deci-
sion in Kyles v. Whitley,3 16 the Court has crafted a standard, consistent
with case law and constitutional safeguards, to determine prejudice in
Brady violations.
A. Before Brady
In Mooney v. Holohan, the Supreme Court held that a conviction
obtained through the use of evidence that the State knows to be false
violates the Fourteenth Amendment.37 The Court rejected the Attor-
ney General's argument that the acts or omissions of the prosecution
cannot, in and by themselves, amount to a denial of due process of
law. 3' The Court also rejected the argument that due process is de-
31. Id. at 266. The Supreme Court held: (1) that undisclosed documents impeaching
eyewitness testimony as to circumstances of abduction were favorable to the defendant for
the purposes of Brady, id. at 289; and (2) that the defendant reasonably relied on the
prosecution's open file policy and established cause for procedural default in raising the
Brady claim, id. at 285, 289; but (3) that defendant could not show materiality under Brady
or prejudice that would excuse defendant's procedural default, id at 296. The first two
determinations by the Court are not particularly relevant for the purposes of this Note and
will not be discussed further to any great extent.
32. See id. at 281.
33. See id. at 280-82 (tracing the evolution of Brady and noting the "special role played
by the American prosecutor" to ensure that justice will be done").
34. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 109 (1935) (per curiam).
35. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
36. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
37. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112-13.
38. Id. at 111-12.
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nied only when an act or omission deprives a defendant of notice or
deprives him of the opportunity to present his own evidence.39  In-
stead, the Court determined that a violation of due process occurs,
regardless of notice, if the State knowingly presents perjured testi-
mony to a court.4 °
Twenty years later in Napue v. Illinois,41 the Court extended
Mooney by holding that a defendant's due process rights are violated
when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows such evi-
dence to go uncorrected when it appears. 42 The Court emphasized
that a prosecuting attorney has the duty to correct what he knows to
be false because the impact of such false evidence can lead to an un-
fair trial.4" Furthermore, the Court found that "a State may not know-
ingly use false evidence, including false testimony . . . [even if] the
false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness."4 4 The
Court also loosely determined a standard by which to measure the
materiality of the prejudice created.45 This standard required that a
new trial be given if there was a reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony affected the judgment of the jury.46
The Mooney and Napue decisions laid the essential groundwork
for the Court to actualize an intelligible rule by which exculpatory
evidence could be defined and measured with certainty to determine
whether prejudice exists and due process has been violated. This rule
emerged in Brady v. Maryland.
39. Id. at 112.
40. Id. The Court explained:
[Due Process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere
notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a
trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony
known to be pejured.
Id.
41. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
42. Id. at 269.
43. Id. at 269-70. The Court explained:
"[Tlhe district attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows
to be false and elicit the truth.... That the district attorney's silence was not the
result of guile or a desire to prejudice matters little, for its impact was the same,
preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be termed fair."
Id. at 270 (quoting New York v. Savvides, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854-55 (N.Y. 1956)).
44. Id. at 269.
45. Id. at 271-72. The Court determined that it was not bound by the lower court's
conclusion that "the false testimony could not in any reasonable likelihood have affected
thejudgment of the jury." Id. In fact, the Court concluded that it is the duty of the Court
to require a new trial when "federal constitutional deprivations" exist. Id.
46. Id.
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B. Brady and Beyond
In 1963, the Court in Brady v. Maryland v extended its holdings in
Mooney and Napue by determining that the prosecution violates the
due process rights of a defendant when it withholds any exculpatory
evidence.48 More specifically, the Court ruled that "suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request vio-
lates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion."4 9 Thus, the Court noted that a finding of materiality was re-
quired, but failed to attach a name to that standard;5" indeed, it would
take the Court another twenty years to articulate an appropriate name
for the standard. 1
In Giglio v. United States, 2 the Court expanded the definition of
exculpatory materials by including impeaching evidence in this cate-
gory. The Court explained that " [w] hen the reliability of a given wit-
ness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of
evidence affecting credibility" will be considered exculpatory.53 The
47. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady v. Maryland, John L. Brady and his companion were
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 84. At his trial, Brady
admitted to participating in the crime, but claimed that his companion had carried out the
actual killing. Id. Prior to the trial, Brady's counsel requested that the prosecution allow
him to examine the companion's extrajudicial statements. Id. Several of these statements
were shown to Brady's counsel. Id. The prosecution, however, withheld the companion's
statement in which he had admitted to the actual killing. Id. This statement did not come
to Brady's attention until after he was tried, convicted, and sentenced, and until after the
Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed his conviction. Id.
In a post-conviction proceeding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the sup-
pression of the evidence by the prosecutor denied Brady due process of law. Brady v. State,
226 Md. 422, 427, 174 A.2d 167, 169 (1961). The court remanded the case regarding the
question of punishment, but not the question of guilt, because the court found that "noth-
ing in [the suppressed confession] could have reduced ... Brady's offense below murder
in the first degree." Id, at 430, 174 A.2d at 171.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Brady was denied a con-
stitutional right when the Court of Appeals of Maryland restricted the new trial to the
question of punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 85. The Court answered in the negative. Id. at
90-91. The Court also held that suppression of exculpatory evidence upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87.
48. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Exculpatory evidence is any evidence favorable to the ac-
cused. Id.
49. Id. (emphasis added). The words "upon request" were removed from this rule in
the Court's decision in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1972).
50. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
51. See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667 (1985), the first case to expressly use "reasonable probability" as the standard by
which to resolve issues of prejudice in Brady violations).
52. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
53. Id. at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Giglio Court then noted that the prosecution will be held responsible
for both the negligent and intentional nondisclosure of such evi-
dence.54 Furthermore, the Court explained that a prosecutor is a fed-
eral or a state actor, and thus, a statement made by a prosecutor is to
be attributed to the government. 55
After the Giglio decision, the Court continued to define the re-
sponsibilities of a prosecutor who possesses exculpatory materials. In
United States v. Agurs,56 the Court explained that "if evidence highly
probative of innocence is in [the prosecutor's] file, he should be pre-
sumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually overlooked
it."'5 7 The Agurs Court also noted that the duty to disclose such evi-
dence is applicable even though there has been no request by the
accused.5" The Agurs Court further identified a rule that is implicit in
the proper materiality standard-"if the omitted evidence creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has
been committed."
59
A decade later, in United States v. Bagley,6" Justice Blackmun ad-
dressed the issue of materiality and the standard to be applied in de-
termining whether a conviction should be reversed because of a
failure to disclose impeaching or exculpatory evidence.6 1 The Court
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
57. Id. at 110. But cf. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (stating that not all possibly favorable
evidence undisclosed by the prosecutor will be judged as prejudicial to the extent that a
new trial is required).
58. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107. In Brady, the Court held that "the suppression by the prose-
cution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process." Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (emphasis added).
59. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112. In Agurs, the Court found that a less demanding standard
was appropriate when the prosecution fails to turn over materials in the absence of a spe-
cific request. Id. at 111-12. The Court refrained from attaching a label to that standard,
but indicated that the standard was somewhat less strict than the harmless-error standard,
which requires the reviewing judge to set aside a verdict unless his "'conviction is sure that
the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect."' Id. at 112 (quoting
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)).
60. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
61. Id. at 678-84 (opinion of Blackmun,J.). Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the
Court and Part III, which was not the opinion of the Court. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 669. Justice
Blackmun explained in Part III, in which Justice O'Connor joined, that reasonable
probability is the proper materiality standard in Brady violation cases. Id. at 682 (opinion
of Blackmun, J.). The Court then reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case to consider "whether there [was] a reasonable probability that, [had
certain evidence] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the trial would have been
different." Id. at 684.
Justice White wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, agreeing with Justice Blackmun's assertion that reasonable probability is the
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determined that "reasonable probability" of a different result was the
appropriate standard to identify prejudice of undisclosed exculpatory
information.62
Bagley took the term "reasonable probability" from Strickland v.
Washington.63 In Strickland, the defendant, who had been convicted of
several violent crimes,64 claimed that his counsel's assistance had been
so ineffective that it required the reversal of his conviction or his
death sentence. 65 The Court determined that the proper standard for
establishing prejudice requires that a "defendant show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."'66 The Court in
Strickland also stated that "a reasonable probability is probability suffi-
cient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 67
After examining the various components of the reasonable
probability standard that the Court had used in Strickland, Justice
Blackmun applied the standard to the issue of materiality in Bagley.6"
In Bagley, the Court outlined aspects of materiality, the examination of
which can aid in the determination of a Brady violation.69 First, due
process requires that the Government disclose "evidence that is both
favorable to the accused and material either to guilt or to punish-
ment." ° Second, Justice Blackmun stated that constitutional error re-
sults when the Government suppresses this evidence "if there is a
reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."71
Justice Blackmun explained that it must be reasonably probable that
appropriate materiality standard. Id. at 668-69, 687 (White,J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
For purposes of this Note, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Part III will be simply re-
ferred to as the opinion of the Bagley Court because of the number of Justices that agreed
with Blackmun's adoption of the term "reasonable probability."
62. See supra note 61.
63. 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun,J.) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
64. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671-72.
65. See id. at 684. The Strickland Court explained that to set aside a death sentence or
reverse a conviction, a defendant must show, first, that counsel's performance was deficient
and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 687.
66. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
69. Id.
70. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brady v. Mary-
land, 473 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
71. Id. at 682 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
2001]
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the evidence would have placed the case in such a different light so as
to "undermine confidence in the outcome. 72 ThirdJustice Blackmun
found the reasonable probability standard "sufficiently flexible" to
pertain to instances when there has been no request for disclosure, a
"general request" for disclosure, and a "special request" by the de-
fense to disclose evidence, thus eliminating the possibility of several
possible standards to measure prejudice in Brady violation cases. 7' Fi-
nally, Justice Blackmun noted that the reviewing court must consider
the Brady violation "in light of the totality of circumstances. 74
The Court implemented the Bagley materiality components in
Kyles v. Whitley.75 Justice Souter wrote for the majority and employed
"reasonable probability" as the standard to measure materiality in
Brady violations. 76 Justice Souter noted in his opinion that "Bagley's
touchstone of materiality is a 'reasonable probability' . . . and the ad-
jective is important., 77 Thus, the Court's use of the reasonable
probability standard to measure the effect of Brady violations is the
result of the Court's careful examination of the history and constitu-
tional implications of Brady and its progeny.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Strickler v. Greene, the Supreme Court held that Strickler could
not show materiality under Brady because he could not illustrate that
there was a reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence
would have been different had the exculpatory material been dis-
closed. 78 Writing for the majority,79justice Stevens initially noted that
"the differing judgments of the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals attest to the difficulty of resolving the issues of prejudice."8 Un-
like the Fourth Circuit, the Court believed that the Stoltzfus testimony
was prejudicial in the sense that it made Strickler's conviction more
likely than had she not testified, and that discrediting Stoltzfus's testi-
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
76. Id. at 434.
77. Id
78. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296.
79. Justice Stevens was joined in full by ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices O'Connor,
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 265. Justice Thomas joined as to Parts I and IV, agree-
ing with the Court's decision to use the reasonable probability standard to determine mate-
riality under Brady. Id. Justices Kennedy and Souter joined in the majority opinion as to
Part III. Id. at 265.
80. Id. at 289.
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mony might have changed the outcome of the trial."' The Court,
however, was quick to note that this standard of prejudice was not the
one that Strickler needed to satisfy.82 Rather, Strickler needed "to
convince [the Court] that 'there [was] a reasonable probability' that the
result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed docu-
ments had been disclosed to the defense."83 The Court further
stressed that the materiality inquiry was a matter of determining
whether the evidence favorable to the defense "'could reasonably be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict."' 84
After extensively reviewing the record, the majority concluded
that even if Stoltzfus and her testimony had been entirely discredited,
the jury might still have concluded that Strickler was the ringleader,
but that proof that he was the dominant criminal participant was not
necessary to convict him of capital murder.8 " The majority concluded
by explaining that Stoltzfus's testimony, which had described Strickler
as having demonstrated aggressive behavior, was not as damaging as
the evidence that he had spent the evening of the murder dancing
and drinking at a bar for about five hours, or that he had killed Whit-
lock with a sixty-nine-pound rock. 6 Therefore, the majority was not
convinced that there was a reasonable probability that the jury would
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 289 (emphasis added). The Court further explained: "'The adjective is im-
portant. The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have re-
ceived a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.'" Id. at 289-90 (quot-
ing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).
84. Id at 290 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435).
85. Id. at 292. The Court justified this statement by noting the trial court's instructions
to the jury which stated that
to convict petitioner of capital murder, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt
that (1) "the defendant killed Leanne Whitlock;" (2) "the killing was willful, de-
liberate and premeditated;" and (3) "the killing occurred during the commission
of robbery while the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, or occurred
during the commission of abduction with intent to extort money or a pecuniary
benefit or with the intent to defile or was of a person during the commission of,
or subsequent to, rape."
Id. at 294 n.44 (quoting Strickler v. Murray, 452 S.E.2d 648, 650 (Va. 1995)).
86. Id. at 295-96. Professor Scott Sundby found that "jurors frequently cited a defen-
dant's lack of remorse as a significant factor in precipitating their decision to impose the
death penalty." Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial
Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1998). Further-
more, "jurors generally based their conclusion that a defendant lacked remorse on factors
other than the defendant's words at trial. In some cases, the jurors based their perceptions
on the nature of the defendant's actions at the time of the crime." Id. at 1561.
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have returned a different verdict had Stoltzfus's testimony been se-
verely impeached or entirely excluded. 7
Writing separately, Justice Souter took issue with the question of
prejudice and materiality and the standard by which it is measured.8"
Justice Souter found that the phrasing of the standard was decep-
tive," and he indicated that the continued use of the term
"probability" caused an unjustifiable risk of misleading courts into
treating it as the more demanding standard of "more likely than
not."90 Justice Souter asserted that the standard of "significant possi-
bility" would be a better term to capture the degree to which the un-
disclosed evidence would place the actual result in question." Justice
Souter justified the use of the significant possibility standard by trac-
ing the evolution of Brady and examining different measures of mate-
riality.92 Furthermore, he determined that the Court had followed a
"circuitous path" in adopting the reasonable probability standard.93
Keeping in mind his own caveat concerning the appropriate level of
materiality, Justice Souter parted with the majority in their determina-
tion that the exculpatory material was inadequate to undermine confi-
dence in the jury's sentencing recommendation.94
IV. ANALYsIs
In Strickler, the Supreme Court, in examining the evolution of
Brady, maintained reasonable probability as the standard by which to
measure materiality for Brady violations.9" Reasonable probability was
first introduced in Bagley as the appropriate standard to resolve issues
of prejudice in matters where the prosecution has failed to disclose
exculpatory documents to the defense.9 6 The Bagley Court's conclu-
sion that reasonable probability was the appropriate standard is con-
87. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296.
88. Id. at 296-97 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Id. at 297.
90. Id. at 300. Justice Souter determined that the term "probability" is misleading in
Brady cases because it is "naturally read as a cognate of 'probably,' and thus confused with
[the] 'more likely than not' [standard]." Id.
91. Id. at 297.
92. Id. at 298-300.
93. Id. at 300.
94. Id. at 301-02. Justice Souter's assessment of materiality turned on two points. First,
he believed that the jurors would have given weight to the degree of leadership exercised
by the defendant. Id. Second, he believed that "no other testimony [came] close to the
prominence and force of Stoltzfus's account in showing Strickler as the unquestionably
dominant member of the trio." Id.
95. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296.
96. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
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sistent with the Court's earlier characterization of the previously
unnamed standard. By preserving this standard in Strickler, the Court
provides a clear guideline by which judges can accurately gauge
whether the prosecution's withholding of exculpatory materials
caused prejudice that deprived the accused of the right to a fair trial.
A. Reasonable Probability: A Standard That Fits
In reviewing Brady and its progeny, it is clear that the Court was
correct in its affirmation that reasonable probability is the proper
standard by which to resolve issues of prejudice when an accused as-
serts a Brady violation. The original configuration of the rule stated
that "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is mate-
rial either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution."97 However, Brady never set forth a stan-
dard by which to define materiality. The Court began its articulation
of an appropriate standard in Agurs,9s where it stated that if there was
any reasonable likelihood that perjured testimony had affected the
verdict, then the resulting conviction must be set aside. 99 In the per-
jured testimony cases where the prosecution knew that the evidence
was false, the Court applied a less demanding materiality standard,
not just because these cases involved "prosecutorial misconduct," but
because they involved "a corruption of the truth-seeking function of
the trial process."'0° This "likelihood" standard was more a punish-
ment for the prosecution's error than a reliable measure of materiality
for Brady violations where the wrongdoing by the prosecution was less
severe. 
101
In Agurs, the Court also expressly rejected any possibility or likeli-
hood standard to measure materiality for a Brady violation.1" 2 The
Agurs Court noted that the prosecutor does not have a constitutional
obligation to disclose all information that might affect the jury's ver-
97. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
98. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 298 (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Court began to articulate a standard by discussing the measure of materiality in instances
when the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony. Id. at 298-99.
99. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The Court seems to regard reason-
able likelihood as the same standard as reasonable possibility or the harmless-error stan-
dard. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 299 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.
101. Id. at 103-04.
102. Id. at 108-10.
2001]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
dict.1°3 The Court justified this by stating that "[t]he mere possibility
that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the de-
fense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not estab-
lish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense. '14 Thus, the Agurs Court
recognized that any kind of possibility standard would be constitution-
ally inadequate to measure the effect of prejudice in Brady violations.
At the same time, the Court rejected a standard that would re-
quire the defendant to demonstrate that the evidence, if disclosed,
"probably would have resulted in acquittal.""°5 The Agurs Court finally
decided upon a middle-of-the-road standard to identify prejudice in
Brady violations.'0 6 The Court, however, attached no specific label to
this standard. 107 The Court in Bagley looked at Agurs to define this
standard as falling somewhere between the "probability standard,"
which is explained above, and a "harmless-error" standard, under
which all nondisclosures are considered to be constitutional errors re-
quiring a new trial unless the reviewing judge is convinced that the
nondisclosure did not influence the jury or had only a very slight ef-
fect.10 8 The Court then correctly established reasonable probability as
the standard by which to measure prejudice for Brady violations be-
cause it is the most appropriate articulation of a middle-of-the-road
standard that falls between the two standards discussed in Agurs.' °9
In his separate opinion in Strickler, Justice Souter claimed that the
Court took a "circuitous path" in adopting the reasonable probability
standard."' It indeed did not. In actualizing reasonable probability,
the Court examined Brady and its progeny and took into account the
severity of prosecutorial misconduct to determine the degree of mate-
103. See id. at 108 ("[T]he prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of
disclosure. But to reiterate a critical point, the prosecutor will not have violated his consti-
tutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the
denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial."); see also supra notes 69-74 and accompanying
text (noting Bagley's four aspects of materiality that assist in determining whether a Brady
violation has occurred).
104. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-10 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 111.
106. Id. at 111-13; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing the Agurs
standard).
107. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111-13. In Agurs, the Court did not articulate a materiality stan-
dard. However, the Court did discuss where this standard should fall in order to accurately
"reflect [the Court's] overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt." Id. at
112.
108. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 (defining the harmless-error standard).
109. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995).
110. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 300 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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riality."' Over the years, the Court has formulated a coherent stan-
dard that falls in between the perjured testimony punishment
standard and any "sporting theory ofjustice" standard." 2 Reasonable
probability is a logical formulation of a standard that is not as de-
manding as the more-likely-than-not standard-an essentially punitive
standard-and more demanding than a mere possibility standard. In
Kyles, the Court determined that the reasonable probability standard
is the appropriate standard to accurately gauge whether the favorable
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict' and the
Strickler Court prudently adhered to this determination.1 1 4
B. Rejecting Significant Possibility: A Capricious Standard
In embracing reasonable probability as the standard by which to
measure materiality in a Brady violation, the Court wisely disregarded
the sliding-scale standard of significant possibility. In his separate
opinion, Justice Souter asserted that the Court should have character-
ized the Brady standard as requiring a significant possibility that the
undisclosed materials would have led the jury to a different deci-
sion." 5 He first noted that-reasonable possibility or reasonable likeli-
hood-the standard not adopted by the Agurs court" 6-and
111. See supra notes 51-76 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the rea-
sonable probability standard in the context of Brady violation cases).
112. SeeAgurs, 427 U.S. at 108-09 & 111-13 n.15 (quoting Bradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
90-91 (1963)). In Brady, the Court stated:
A sporting theory of justice might assume that if the suppressed confession had
been used at the first trial, the judge's ruling that it was not admissible on the
issue of innocence or guilt might have been flouted by the jury just as might have
been done if the court had first admitted a confession and then stricken it from
the record. But we cannot raise that trial strategy to the dignity of a constitutional
right and say that deprival of this defendant of that sporting chance through the
use of a bifurcated trial denies him due process or violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
113. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.
114. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296 (holding that "petitioner has not shown that there is a
reasonable probability that his conviction . . . would have been different had [the] materials
been disclosed" (emphasis added)).
115. Id. at 297 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 119-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Agurs, Justice
Marshall argued that the standard for materiality should be a significant chance standard,
stating that "[i]f there is a significant chance that the withheld evidence . . . would have
induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction, then the
judgment ... must be set aside." Id. at 119 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, he stated
that reasonable likelihood is "virtually identical" to his significant chance standard and
recognized that the Court advocated the use of this likelihood standard for a limited cate-
gory of cases-cases where the prosecution knew that testimony was perjured-thus indi-
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reasonable probability do indeed express distinct levels of confidence
concerning the effects of prejudice.1 17 However, Justice Souter as-
serted that the distinction among the standards is slight." 8 He fur-
ther stated that "the gap between all three of those formulations and
'more-likely-than-not' is greater than any differences among them."" 9
Noting the larger gap between more-likely-than-not and the other
three standards, Justice Souter erroneously argued that it would be
misleading for courts to use the term "probability" because it is so
closely related to the word "probably."'120 Thus, Justice Souter deter-
mined that the reasonable probability standard would be mistaken for
the more-likely-than-not standard. 12  It was through this imprecise
reasoning that he arrived at the conclusion that "significant possibil-
ity" is the "proper" way to phrase the Brady materiality standard. 22
In fact, the "significant possibility" standard could be equally as
deceptive, for this phrase is naturally read as simply "possibility."
Thus, it is likely to be equated with reasonable possibility, the less de-
manding standard. Furthermore, the Court in Bagley chose not to
adopt this less demanding standard when it articulated a standard for
identifying prejudice in Brady violations.121
The Bagley decision was not the first to dismiss a possibility stan-
dard when resolving issues of prejudice in Brady violations.1 24 In
Agurs, the Court stated that materiality is not satisfied by "[t] he mere
possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped
the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial."' 25 In
Agurs, the Court did not accept Justice Marshall's characterization of
the Brady standard-that "[i] f there is a significant chance that the with-
held evidence, developed by skilled counsel, would have induced a
reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a conviction,
then the judgment of conviction must be set aside.' 1 26 In Strickland v.
caing that this is a punitive standard for cases involving prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at
120.
117. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 300 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun,J.) (deter-
mining that "reasonable probability" is "sufficiently flexible to cover specific, general, or no
request nondisclosures); see also id. at 713-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
standard for materiality should be "reasonable likelihood").
124. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976).
125. Id.
126. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Washington, the Court once again struck down the significant chance
standard in favor of the reasonable probability standard.127  The
Court has repeatedly recognized that any chance standard is akin to a
possibility standard, and neither establish materiality in the constitu-
tional sense. 128 Thus, the Court has determined that these types of
standards are not reliable enough to resolve issues of prejudice in
Brady violations when an accused's constitutional rights are at issue.
In sum, "significant chance" and Justice Souter's "significant pos-
sibility" both can be read and understood as simply "possibility."
Thus, these standards easily could be equated with the less demanding
standard of reasonable possibility. The Agurs Court emphasized that a
"mere possibility ... does not establish 'materiality' in the constitu-
tional sense."'12  In fact, the Court has long maintained that the "law
rarely offers judgments on proof of mere possibilities. '
It was Justice Souter himself who stated that the adjective in a
standard is important.' 3 ' The adjective that should receive careful at-
tention in a standard that decides an accused's individual rights is the
adjective that is the most identifiable and cognizable. This adjective
would then be the second word in the Brady phraseology-the word
that allows the standard to be read as either possibility or probability.
It is for this reason that the Court cannot employ any standard which
127. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). In his Strickland dissent, Justice Marshall again advocated
a significant chance standard, asserting that
a person on death row.., should not be compelled to demonstrate a "reasonable
probability" that he would have been given a life sentence if his lawyer had been
competent; if the defendant can establish a significant chance that the outcome
would have been different, he surely should be entitled to a redetermination of
his fate.
Id. at 716-17 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
128. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1963) ("[W]e cannot . . . say that the
deprival of the defendant of [a] sporting chance through the use of a bifurcated trial
denies him due process or violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." (citation omitted)); supra notes 122-126 (discussing the rejection of a chance or
possibility standard in Bagley, Agurs, and Strickland).
129. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-10.
130. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 56 (1948) (Jackson,J., dissenting in part). In
his partial dissent, Justice Jackson noted three decisions in which the Court has refused to
offer ajudgment using a possibility standard. These decisions were Standard Fashion Co. v.
Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356 (1922) ("[The Court] doles] not think that the
purpose in using the word 'may' was to prohibit the mere possibility of the consequences
described."); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930) (noting that the Clay-
ton Act "deals only with such acquisitions as probably will result in lessening competition to
a substantial degree"); and Corn Products Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945) (discussing
the provisions of the Clayton Act and stating that "the use of the word 'may' was not to
prohibit discriminations having 'the mere possibility' of those consequences, but to reach
those which would probably have the defined effect on competition").
131. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
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incorporates the term possibility, including Justice Souter's significant
possibility standard, for it naturally could be read as reasonable possi-
bility, the less demanding standard, which the Court has never
adopted in Brady violation cases. 112
The Court's repeated failure to adopt these possibility or chance
standards demonstrates that the Court is not willing to employ a stan-
dard that so closely resembles a mere "possibility" for cases of this con-
stitutional magnitude, for mere possibilities do not have the capacity
to safeguard an individual's due process rights. Thus, the Court pru-
dently preserved the reasonable probability standard to determine the
level of materiality in Brady violations. This standard is reliable, and it
will prevent inconsistencies in the law and will avoid occurrences of
injustice.
C. Protecting Due Process, Preventing Injustice
The Court has correctly decided that reasonable probability is the
most appropriate and reliable standard to gauge issues that concern
fundamental constitutional protections. In his separate opinion in
Strickler, Justice Souter stated that "significant possibility" is a better
way to phrase the materiality standard that gauges whether an accused
received a fair trial. "3 He implies that significant possibility and rea-
sonable probability are the same standard, and that the former is sim-
ply a clearer expression of the rule.134 Therefore, it seems thatJustice
Souter believes that the significant possibility standard is a standard
that is able to gauge issues that concern constitutional rights.
However, the two standards are not the same; in fact, they are
quite different and have been employed by the Court to measure dis-
similar issues in the law.' 35 The difference in the two standards be-
comes evident when Justice Souter notes in which contexts the various
phrases have been used."3 6 The two standards can be contrasted by
132. See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's rejection of
possibility standards to measure prejudice in Brady violations).
133. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 297 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that when the Court describes the standard as reasonable probability, he "[takes it]
to mean . . . significant possibility").
134. Id.
135. See Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. Schulinghamp, 419 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1974)
("[T] he general standards governing the grant of a stay application [are]: there must be a
reasonable probability that four members of the Court would consider the underlying is-
sue meritorious for the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; there
must be a significant possibility of reversal of the lower court's decision; and there must be
a likelihood that irreparable harm will result if that decision is not stayed.").
136. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 300 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
[VOL. 60:373
STRICKLER V. GREENE
considering the three-part test to grant a stay pending certiorari. 137
The significant possibility standard is employed when the Court exam-
ines whether the Court will reverse the lower court's decision.'18 The
Court also uses the reasonable probability standard in this three-part
test.'33 To justify a grant of application to stay, there must be a rea-
sonable probability that four members of the Court will consider the
underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari or
the notation of probable jurisdiction. 140 The Supreme Court's use of
the two standards to measure two requirements of different weight in
the judicial process implies that there is a significant difference be-
tween the two standards. It can be inferred from this distinction that
the Court recognizes significant possibility as a less demanding stan-
dard because it simply is used to determine whether the decision
might be overturned. This requirement does not carry as much im-
portance as the Court's jurisdiction, which is a constitutional neces-
sity. Because the latter is measured by reasonable probability, it is
evident that this is the standard that the Court considers to be more
reliable to resolve questions of constitutionality.
Because the Court in Strickler must employ a standard that will
preserve a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, it logically
follows that the Court would use the reasonable probability standard
as opposed to the significant possibility standard, which the Court has
never adopted to determine issues of constitutionality. Certainly,
when the situation warrants the Court's involvement, implementing
the reasonable probability standard is the most effective way to
achieve a legally accurate conclusion without diluting a defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial.
Thus, the significant possibility standard is not simply a better re-
phrasing of the reasonable probability standard, as Justice Souter
stated in his partial dissent."' In fact, it is a less demanding material-
ity standard than reasonable probability, and it is not used by the
Court to determine fundamental constitutional protection issues. In-
deed, the Strickler Court was prudent in preserving the reasonable
probability standard, for it is the standard that the Court has repeat-
137. See Times-Picayune, 419 U.S. at 1305; see also supra note 136 (discussing bow the two
standards are implemented in a stay pending certiorari); see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 300
n.3 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. See Times-Picayune, 419 U.S. at 1305; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 300 n.3 (Souter, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139. See Times-Picayune, 419 U.S. at 1305; see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 300 n.3 (Souter, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. See Times-Picayune, 419 U.S. at 1305.
141. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 297 (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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edly employed to safeguard the procedural due process rights of crim-
inal defendants while ensuring that unjust decisions have not been
reached.
V. CONCLUSION
In Strickler, the Supreme Court prudently preserved reasonable
probability as the standard by which to measure whether the defen-
dant received a fair trial in the absence of certain exculpatory material
undisclosed to the defense. 4 2  By preserving the reasonable
probability standard to resolve issues of prejudice in Brady violations,
the majority correctly rejected the sliding-scale significant possibility
standard. The Court recognized that the significant possibility stan-
dard can not establish materiality in the constitutional sense and that
reasonable probability is the more appropriate standard by which to
ensure that an accused's procedural due process rights are protected.
Thus, the Court in Strickler has provided a reliable and coherent stan-
dard for judges to gauge whether the trial was one worthy of confi-
dence. The Court's continuing application of the reasonable
probability standard not only allows judges to accurately measure the
effect of Brady violations, but because of its certainty, the standard also
provides for the protection of an accused's constitutional rights,
thereby preventing occurrences of injustice.
CORINNE M. NASTRO
142. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289-90.
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